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Abstract
According to metaphysical realism, we would have to compare our 
thought with mind-independent reality, if we want to gain knowledge 
about the world. Such a comparison is impossible. Yet we can gain 
knowledge about the world. So metaphysical realism is false. — I take 
this to be the historically most influential argumentative line oppos-
ing metaphysical realism. The paper develops this argument, the Main 
Anti-Realist Argument, in more detail and offers a brief critical discus-
sion of its crucial assumptions.
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Consider the following argument; it is an argument against meta-
physical realism, and its general drift should seem rather familiar:
We cannot step outside our own minds to compare our thoughts 
with mind-independent reality. Yet, on the realist correspon-
dence view of truth, this is what we would have to do to gain 
knowledge of the world. We would have to access reality as it is in 
itself, to determine whether our thoughts correspond to it. Since 
all our access to the world is mediated by our cognition, this is 
impossible. Hence, on realism, knowledge of the world would 
be impossible. Since knowledge of the world is possible, realism 
must be wrong.
Metaphysical realism is usually identified as the view that much of 
the world is mind-independent and that truth is correspondence be-
tween thought and the world. Anti-realism is opposed to this view. 
As I see it, the argument sketched above is (in some form or other) a 
crucially important motivation driving anti-realist attitudes. The ar-
gument says, in a nutshell, that metaphysical realism must inevitably 
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succumb to global skepticism about the external world, and must, 
therefore, be wrong. I will call it the Main Anti-Realist Argument.
My formulation of the argument is a bit loose. This is deliber-
ate. I intend it to capture a theme, a motif, recurring in anti-realist 
thought. Anti-realists of all persuasions — pragmatists, positivists, 
neo-positivists, verificationists, classical idealists, transcendental 
idealists, existentialists, post-modernists — have aimed versions of 
this sort of argument, variations on this theme, against their meta-
physical realist targets. Actually, I tend to think that this theme is in 
fact the anti-realist leitmotif; that it has been (and still is) the stron-
gest attracting force drawing people away from metaphysical realism 
and towards anti-realist positions, or making such positions appear 
tempting. I will not try to argue for this claim here. I hope you find 
it sufficiently compelling to stay with me.1
My aim in this paper is to identify some of the operative assump-
tions that enter into the Main Anti-Realist Argument. I will raise 
some pertinent critical questions about these assumptions, but I will 
not discuss them in very much detail in this paper — that would be 
on the agenda of a much larger project. Here, I just want to identify 
some of the main points pertaining to the argument that I suggest 
need looking after and to comment on them briefly.
I begin with two somewhat preliminary points: one concerns the 
relation between metaphysical realism and correspondence truth; 
the other concerns the role played by skepticism, or rather, the de-
nial of skepticism, in the Main Anti-Realist Argument.
The Main Anti-Realist Argument assumes (or maybe better: 
those who wield the argument assume) that metaphysical realism is 
tied very closely to the correspondence theory of truth — I have deliber-
ately formulated the argument above as incorporating this assump-
tion. The assumption is problematic. It raises a terminological issue, 
concerning the proper use of the label ‘metaphysical realism’, as well 
as a substantive issue, concerning the relation between the thesis of 
1 José Zalabardo has pointed out to me that Anthony Brueckner published 
a paper entitled “The Anti-Realist’s Master Argument” in 1992. The paper is 
concerned with a Dummett-style anti-realist argument, concerning the theory of 
linguistic meaning and evidence-transcendent truth-conditions. Times change. 
From today’s perspective, it seems that the more traditional argument outlined 
here never lost its title to being the main argument opposing realism.
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mind-independence (i.e. the thesis that much of the world is mind-
independent) and the correspondence theory of truth. Take the lat-
ter issue, the substantive one, first.
Advocates of arguments along the lines of the Main Argument 
typically treat mind-independence and correspondence-truth as a 
package deal (if they distinguish them at all), presupposing (or talk-
ing as if they presuppose) that one entails the other. Strictly speak-
ing, this is wrong. Mind-independence does not entail correspon-
dence-truth: one can consistently embrace mind-independence and 
reject any form of correspondence theory. For example, advocates of 
deflationist theories of truth hold that truth has no nature and reject 
the correspondence theory, usually on the grounds that the notion of 
correspondence is redundant or defective in some way, or not scien-
tifically respectable. Advocates of primitivism about truth reject the 
correspondence theory on the grounds that truth is not definable in 
any sense of ‘definable’. Such anti-correspondence views about truth 
are not, a fortiori, committed to the rejection of mind-independence. 
Now for the terminological issue. The label ‘metaphysical real-
ism’ is often applied to the package of mind-independence and corre-
spondence-truth. If so, the assumption that realism, in this sense, is 
tied to correspondence truth is of course not problematic, and an ar-
gument targeting primarily correspondence-truth, such as the Main 
Anti-Realist Argument, will obviously be an argument against real-
ism thus defined. However, since mind-independence does not re-
ally entail correspondence-truth, the package is, logically speaking, 
a mere conjunction, hence such an argument, while attacking real-
ism thus defined, will not automatically attack the thesis of mind-
independence. This is awkward, because it is the thesis of mind-in-
dependence that is the real target of most anti-realist argumentation. 
If, on the other hand, the label ‘metaphysical realism’ is applied more 
narrowly, and by my lights more properly, namely to the thesis of 
mind-independence only, then the assumption that realism, in this 
sense, is tied to correspondence truth is false, and the Main Argu-
ment, since it proceeds by attacking correspondence-truth, is bound 
not to reach its intended target.
What to do?
One might look into the question whether there can be (or wheth-
er there already is) an argument attacking metaphysical realism that 
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is recognizably similar to the Main Argument but does not proceed 
by attacking the correspondence theory of truth. This strikes me as 
potentially interesting, but I won’t pursue it here.
Note that the opponents of metaphysical realism are by no means 
alone in treating mind-independence and correspondence-truth as a 
package deal. Philosophers advocating mind-independence (or tak-
ing it for granted) have typically also advocated some form of corre-
spondence theory of truth (or have taken it for granted). Moreover, 
this is hardly a coincidence: mind-independence and the correspon-
dence theory do go together nicely; their logical independence not-
withstanding, they make for a very natural package. In view of the 
historical importance of this combination, it is helpful for certain 
purposes, I think, to continue this (strictly speaking questionable) 
tradition and to treat mind-independence and correspondence-truth 
as a package deal, which is what I am going to do in this paper; and 
following a closely related (questionable) tradition, I will continue to 
use the label ‘metaphysical realism’ for the package deal.
Returning briefly, by way of an afterthought, to the substantive 
issue, I want to note that the correspondence theory of truth does 
not entail mind-independence either. This is easy to tell from the fact 
that one can advocate a position combining the thesis of mind-depen-
dence with a commitment to correspondence-truth, e.g.: ‘A judg-
ment (belief) is true iff it corresponds with some fact; and all facts 
are mind-dependent’. Advocacy of a correspondence theory of truth 
may carry the (Gricean) implicature of mind-independence (meta-
physical realism), but this implicature can be cancelled. Though this 
is not, strictly speaking, directly relevant to the topic at hand, it is 
of some interest for a proper understanding of the relation between 
anti-realism and realism in general.2
My second preliminary point concerns the role played by external-
world skepticism, or rather, the denial of external-world skepticism, in 
the Main Anti-Realist Argument. Note that the argument divides 
into two stages. The first stage, making up the bulk of the formulation 
2 As to realism and the correspondence theory, note that realists have to resist 
the temptation to build mind-independence into the definition of truth, along the 
lines of: ‘A judgment is true iff it corresponds with some mind-independent fact’. 
Since mental states are not mind-independent, such a definition would, absurdly, 
imply that all judgments about mental states are untrue.
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above, ends with the intermediate conclusion that, given metaphysi-
cal realism, knowledge of the external world would be impossible. 
The second stage comes with the very last sentence, which says that 
knowledge of the external world is possible, from which it is con-
cluded that metaphysical realism must be wrong.
As far as the first stage is concerned, its import might be entirely 
skeptical: taking metaphysical realism for granted, one might go on 
to infer that we cannot have any knowledge of an external world. 
The first stage leads into an argument against realism only if, and as 
soon as, one adds, by way of the second stage, the denial of skepticism 
concerning our knowledge of the external world, thus reaching, by 
modus tollens, the rejection of metaphysical realism as the conclusion 
of the overall argument.
Note that the premise required at the second stage for the turn 
against realism is not that we actually have knowledge of the exter-
nal world. Since the first stage of the argument claims that, on the 
realist view, knowledge of the world would be impossible, all that is 
required for the second stage is: knowledge of the world is possible. 
The Main Anti-Realist Argument thus takes the form of a transcen-
dental argument against metaphysical realism.
Consider, by way of comparison, the following passage from 
Kant’s Jäsche Logic — which I should be quoting in any case, because 
this passage served to some extent as a model for my formulation of 
the Main Argument:
Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with its object. 
In consequence of this mere nominal explanation, my cognition, to 
count as true, is supposed to agree with its object. Now I can compare 
the object with my cognition, however, only by cognizing it. Hence my 
cognition is supposed to confirm itself, which is far short from being 
sufficient for truth. For since the object is outside me, the cognition 
in me, all I can ever pass judgment on is whether my cognition of the 
object agrees with my cognition of the object. The ancients called such 
a circle in explanation a diallelon. (Kant 1800: Introduction VII).
The passage covers only the first stage of an argument against 
metaphysical realism: the ground is prepared, but the actual turn 
against realism is not executed (not yet?). Kant brings up the cor-
respondence theory of truth, and then questions the utility of 
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correspondence as a criterion or test of truth (“my cognition, to count 
as true [um als wahr zu gelten], is supposed to agree with its object”); 
and he questions it radically: given that truth is correspondence with 
the external world, he says, we can’t have any knowledge of the ex-
ternal world. The import of the passage could be entirely skeptical.
As far as Kant is concerned, it is not clear to me whether his over-
all view might be adequately summarized by saying that he would 
continue from here by rejecting skepticism, and, consequently, re-
jecting metaphysical realism, embracing his transcendental idealism 
instead. Maybe this would be too simplistic, even as a short summary 
of Kant’s brand of anti-realism. However, I am sure that many other 
anti-realists will agree wholeheartedly with the passage from Kant 
and will continue in the manner described, though they might well 
arrive at a brand of anti-realism different from Kant’s transcendental 
idealism.
Having distinguished two stages of the Main Anti-Realist Argu-
ment, I will focus exclusively on the first stage for the remainder of 
this paper. The second, anti-skeptical stage of the argument, execut-
ing the anti-realist turn, is of course crucial. Nevertheless, I will set 
it aside. The denial of skepticism is not where the action is in the 
debate between anti-realists and realists. That debate turns rather on 
the issues mooted in the first stage of the argument, especially on the 
distinctive theme of “comparing” cognition (thought, belief) with its 
object (reality, facts). For ease of reference, I repeat my formulation 
of the argument here:
We cannot step outside our own minds to compare our thoughts 
with mind-independent reality. Yet, on the realist correspon-
dence view of truth, this is what we would have to do to gain 
knowledge of the world. We would have to access reality as it is in 
itself, to determine whether our thoughts correspond to it. Since 
all our access to the world is mediated by our cognition, this is 
impossible. Hence, on realism, knowledge of the world would 
be impossible. Since knowledge of the world is possible, realism 
must be wrong.
Focusing on what I called the first stage of the argument (the 
whole text, minus the last sentence), we can distinguish two aspects 
or parts within that first stage. One part, call it the first part, says 
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that there is something we cannot do, namely compare our thoughts 
with reality to ascertain a relevant correspondence relation holding 
between them (Can’t Compare). The second part says that we have to do 
it, on a realist correspondence account of truth, if we are to obtain 
knowledge of the world (Must Compare).
I will look at the second part first.
The following line of reasoning seems to figure crucially in this 
second part: If truth is correspondence with reality, then, since 
knowledge requires truth, we have to know that our beliefs corre-
spond with reality, if we are to know anything about reality.
A point of clarification. The relevant claim here is not that, on the 
assumption that truth is correspondence with reality, I have to know 
the general proposition that my beliefs correspond with reality, in order 
to know anything about reality. The intended claim must be, rather, 
that with respect to any given belief of mine, I have to know of that 
belief that it corresponds with reality, in order for that belief to con-
stitute a piece of knowledge. So, for example, the claim is: given that 
truth is correspondence with reality, to know that my shirt is grey, 
I have to know of my belief that my shirt is grey that it corresponds 
with reality.
But how, one should ask, does knowledge of the nature of truth 
enter into a necessary condition for knowledge of such humdrum 
matters as the color of my shirt? There is a double-move being made 
in the line of reasoning above. It starts, importantly, from the in-
nocuous observation that knowledge requires truth (this brings truth 
into the picture), and then moves quickly, via assumptions (1) and 
(2), see below, to a lemma, (3), saying that, given realism, in order 
to know something, one needs to know of one’s belief that it cor-
responds with reality.
(1) S knows p, only if S knows of her belief p that it is true.
(2) If truth = correspondence with reality, then S knows of her 
belief p that it is true, only if S knows of her belief p that it 
corresponds with reality.
(3) If truth = correspondence with reality, then S knows p, only 
if S knows of her belief p that it corresponds with reality.
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The first move is made with assumption (1). It may look innocu-
ous enough, merely reminding us of the initial, the uncontentious 
clauses in the analysis of propositional knowledge. But note that as-
sumption (1) is not actually underwritten by the analysis of knowl-
edge, whose initial, uncontentious clauses run like this: ‘S knows p, 
only if (i) S believes p, (ii) p is true, (iii)…’. Knowledge does indeed 
require truth, but this point yields no more than the requirement 
that your belief has to be true in order to constitute a piece of knowl-
edge (the innocuous point); it does not yield the requirement that, 
in order for your belief to constitute a piece of knowledge, you also 
have to know, or even believe, that your belief is true.
Three opposing considerations seem especially pertinent con-
cerning assumption (1). First, there are subjects (small children, 
higher animals) who know things without having the conceptual re-
sources to form meta-beliefs about the truth of their own beliefs. 
The assumption belongs to an epistemological tradition that tended 
to over-intellectualize knowledge. Second, acquisition of informa-
tion comes through perception and reasoning. Even with respect to 
subjects who clearly are in a position to form meta-beliefs about the 
truth of their own beliefs, perception and reasoning do not normal-
ly deliver, and certainly do not have to deliver, such meta-beliefs. 
Third, the assumption intimates that knowledge about the world can 
be acquired only via inference from known premises about the truth 
of one’s own beliefs. This is quite implausible. Perceptual knowl-
edge never works that way. Inferential knowledge might, in certain 
special cases, but usually does not. Note especially that, even when 
you acquire knowledge through an informant known by you to be 
reliable, the meta-premise in play would be that her, the informant’s, 
professed belief is true, not that your own belief is true.
The second move is made with assumption (2). Assumption (1) 
functioned to pave the way by bringing truth into the picture. As-
sumption (2) now aims to build on this and to bring in the corre-
spondence account of the nature of truth. Of course, truth and its 
nature are in the picture already, in one way: since knowledge re-
quires that your belief be true, it requires that your belief corre-
spond with reality, given the correspondence account of truth. But 
our argument is not satisfied with this innocuous point (though hav-
ing it in the background may help lending some credibility to the 
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argument). Our argument wants to bring the nature of truth into 
the picture in an importantly different way. Assumptions (1) and (2) 
between them aim to put, as it were, the nature of truth into the 
content of a knower’s meta-belief. They aim to require that, in order 
to know anything, p, however mundane, the subject must be aware 
of the correspondence nature of truth; and they aim to put this re-
quirement at the feet of the realist correspondence account of truth.
There are two main opposing considerations that seem especially 
pertinent here. First, assumption (2) should be charged with com-
mitting an intensional fallacy, similar to: If a = b, S knows that a is 
F, only if S knows that b is F. Only in this case the fallacy involves a 
property identity: If being F = being G, S knows of a that it is F, only 
if S knows of a that it is G. (That is: If being true = corresponding with 
reality, then S knows of a belief a that it is true, only if S knows of a 
that it corresponds with reality.) Using this kind of reasoning, one 
might argue, fallaciously: Since water is H2O, our ancestors knew 
that they were drinking water, only if they knew that they were 
drinking H2O; and since they didn’t know they were drinking H2O, 
they didn’t know that they were drinking water.
Second, assumption (2) should be charged with failing to proper-
ly distinguish a (proposed) definition or account of the nature truth, 
on the one hand, from a process or procedure by which one comes to 
know that something is true, on the other hand.3 A definition of the 
nature of F does not have to, and often will not, provide any sort of 
procedure for coming to know whether something is F. Specifically, 
a definition of the nature of truth, an advocate of the correspondence 
account ought to insist, does not have to provide a procedure for 
coming to know whether something is true; and the correspondence 
3 In this context it may be illuminating to take a second look at the beginning 
of the Kant passage from the Jäsche Logic, cited above, where Kant says that, in 
consequence of the correspondence definition, his cognition “to count as true 
[um als wahr zu gelten], is supposed to agree with its object”. Note the neat double 
function of the phrase ‘to count as true’. Looking back at the definition of truth, 
this can be read in the spirit of ‘to count as true by the lights of the definition’, 
that is, as: ‘to be true’. Looking forward to his bringing up epistemic matters, it 
lends itself to be read as: ‘to be rationally believed to be true’. Read both ways at 
once, it serves to make an illegitimate transition from the definition of truth to 
epistemic matters pertaining to how one comes to know that something is true.
Marian David182
account does not, and is not intended to, provide such a procedure. 
One can come to know that a liquid is water from the way it looks 
and tastes (etc.), one does not have to go through its H2O-nature, 
performing a chemical analysis, to come to know that it is water. 
Similarly for truth. Though, admittedly, there is also a disanalogy, 
because going through the chemical analysis does provide one good 
way of coming to know that a liquid is water. This does not seem to 
be the case with the correspondence theory. How does one come to 
know of one’s own belief p that it is true? Here is one good way. First 
you come to know p. Then you reflect (for some reason) on your own 
beliefs, coming to believe and know that you have the belief p, then 
you infer that your belief p is true, exploiting or presupposing your 
(implicit?) knowledge of the principle that p entails that p is true.
Much hinges in this connection on the general question of what 
is required for a definition or account of something to be adequate. 
A requirement to the effect that a definition of being F is adequate, 
only if it leads directly to a procedure for finding out whether some-
thing is F would work against the line taken above by the advocate 
of a realist correspondence account of truth. On the other hand, 
such a requirement on definitional adequacy seems motivated only 
on the background of some form of anti-realist position (verifica-
tionism, operationalism, pragmatism). Hence, bringing it up at this 
point would seem to beg the question against metaphysical realism.
Up to now I have deliberately kept at arm’s length the crucial 
theme of comparing thought with reality, trying to get an idea about 
how much ground the Main Anti-Realist Argument will cover with-
out going into it. Now is the point where the comparison-theme has 
to enter, by way of assumption (4), which leads to the conclusion, 
(5), of the second part of the argument, saying that, on the realist 
correspondence theory of truth, one can know something, only if 
one has compared one’s belief with reality:
(4) S knows of her belief p that it corresponds with reality, only 
if S has compared her belief p with reality.
(5) If truth = correspondence with reality, S knows p, only if S 
has compared her belief p with reality.
Here is a consideration opposing assumption (4) that builds on a 
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point made above in the discussion of assumption (2). I said that one 
good way of coming to know of one’s belief p that it is true is this: 
First one comes to know p. Then one reflects (for some reason) on 
one’s own beliefs, coming to know that one holds the belief p; then 
one infers that one’s belief p is true. This, I said vis à vis (2), is how 
one can come to know of one’s belief p that it is true, without know-
ing of one’s belief p that it corresponds with reality. Now, if one does 
know the correspondence account of truth, if one does know that 
truth is correspondence with reality, the continuation of the story 
works against assumption (4). Given one knows of one’s belief p that 
it is true, and given one knows that truth is correspondence with 
reality, one can come to know that one’s belief p corresponds with 
reality without having to compare one’s belief p with reality.
Consider now the consequent of the conclusion (5): S knows p, 
only if S has compared her belief p with reality. As a general con-
dition on knowledge, this should strike you as very strange. Much 
(most) acquisition of information does not proceed by comparing be-
liefs one already has with anything. Perceptual processes and infer-
ence processes do not proceed by comparing beliefs one already has, 
they proceed by forming beliefs which, under the right conditions, 
then constitute pieces of knowledge. Talk of ‘comparing’ drops out 
of the picture, when one thinks of how perception and inference 
based on perception lead to the formation of beliefs: for the most 
part, talk of ‘comparing’ is just a bad metaphor.
Yet, the second part of the Main Argument nevertheless claims 
that metaphysical realism, because it takes truth to be correspon-
dence with reality, is committed to the view that one knows some-
thing, only if one has compared one’s belief with reality. The rea-
son for this claim being mainly assumptions (1), (2), and (4), which 
harbor an ill-motivated meta-knowledge requirement on knowledge, 
an intensional fallacy, the failure to distinguish definitions from de-
scriptions of procedures for the acquisition of knowledge, and a bad 
general picture of the workings of the acquisition of knowledge.
However, the picture of knowing by comparing is not entirely 
wrong. Sometimes, it seems, we do compare, namely when we check 
the accuracy of beliefs we already have, when we test our beliefs or 
theories. The second part of the Main Argument, then, treats all 
coming to know as checking, all knowing as having checked. This 
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is wrong, even if there are cases where one does come to know by 
checking one’s beliefs — even if there are many such cases: their 
numbers are still small compared to the massive amount of cases 
where one acquires knowledge without checking.
I turn now briefly to the other part of the Main Anti-Realist Ar-
gument, the first part. Remember, it said that we cannot do what 
according to the second part we have to do, namely compare our 
beliefs with reality to ascertain that the relation of correspondence 
holds between them.  
The first part of the Main Argument focuses on comparing cogni-
tion (beliefs) with reality (facts, things and their properties). But its 
central claim seems to apply quite generally to comparing anything 
with anything: beliefs with facts, facts with facts, things with things, 
beliefs with beliefs (cognitions with cognitions). The central claim 
made by the first part seems to be:
Can’t Compare: We can never compare X itself with Y itself, we can 
only compare our cognition of X with our cognition of Y.
Taken seriously, this claim would launch an infinite regress, for 
obviously my cognition of X and my cognition of Y will themselves be 
new items, X and Y, which, according to the claim, I can’t compare 
directly; instead, I can only compare my cognitions of these cogni-
tions, and so on. If the claim is not to lead to the conclusion that 
nothing can ever be compared with anything, it has to be restricted. 
The intended restriction must be to items that are not themselves 
cognitions, that is X and Y must not be cognitions; for the Main Ar-
gument assumes, apparently, that we can compare our cognitions.
Here is a weaker claim, not leading immediately into trouble, 
which one might grant at least for the sake of argument (keeping in 
mind that X and Y are not cognitions):
Can Compare Only If: I can compare my cognition of X with Y only 
by employing a further cognition, namely a cognition of Y.
Say this is true (and let us suppress worries about how, exactly, 
‘cognition of X’ is to be spelled out). Say I can compare my cognition 
of X with Y only by employing a cognition of Y. This does not show 
that what I end up comparing thereby is merely my cognition of X 
with my cognition of Y. But this is the thesis the Main Anti-Realist 
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Argument would need. It is hard to see where this negative thesis is 
supposed to come from. The above claim tells me that I can do one 
thing, A, only by doing another thing, B. Because of just this, I am 
supposed to accept the strong negative conclusion that I cannot really 
do A after all, that I can merely do A*, which is different from A, 
and which is not what is wanted or needed. Yet, no further reason is 
provided for this negative conclusion. Even granting the claim above, 
the alternative hypothesis is still available, namely the hypothesis that 
I can do A, from which it follows, given the claim above, that the way 
to do A, apparently, is by doing B. That is, even granting the claim 
Can Compare Only If, the hypothesis is available that I can compare my 
cognition of X with Y, namely by employing (among other things) a 
cognition of Y.4
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